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INTRODUCTION 
Social anxiety, defined as "anxiety resulting from 
the prospect or presence of interpersonal evaluation in 
real or imagined social settings" (Schlenker & Leary, 
1982, p. 642), has been the focus of considerable 
investigation in psychological literature in recent 
years. Certainly, the phenomenon of social anxiety is 
worthy of such attention, as it is experienced by a great 
many people. In fact, Zimbardo's (1977) world-wide 
survey found that 80% of his sample was shy at some point 
in their lives, and 40% of these people considered 
themselves shy at present. Twenty-five percent of his 
sample called themselves chronically shy, and 4% reported 
feeling shy virtually all of the time and in all 
situations. Pilkonis, Feldman, Himmelhoch, and Cornes 
(1980) stated that 15%-20% of the general adult 
population exhibits distressing social anxiousness. 
Social anxiety has been characterized as more 
distressing, debilitating, and pervasive than other 
frequently studied analogue anxiety disorder populations. 
Further, it has been suggested that high degrees of 
social anxiety may actually be a risk factor for the 
1 
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development of more serious psychopathology (Curran, 
1977; Smith, Ingram, & Brehm, 1983). 
Some confusion is found in the literature regarding 
the definition of social anxiety, particularly as it is 
sometimes used interchangeably with the term "shyness." 
Shyness can be viewed from two perspectives: (1) the 
affective or cognitive experience characterized by 
nervousness and apprehension in interpersonal situations 
(e.g., Leary & Schlenker, 1981; Zimbardo, 1977); and, (2) 
the behavioral component exhibited by reticence, 
inhibition, or social avoidance (Pilkonis, 1977). Hence, 
shyness includes both "feeling shy" and "acting shy" 
(Leary, 1986a). Social anxiety--whether in the form of 
speech anxiety, dating anxiety, or communication 
apprehension--refers to this former aspect of shyness, 
i.e., the subjective experience of the shy individual. 
Subjective social anxiety and interpersonal reticence 
do not necessarily occur together, as one may feel 
nervous in a social encounter but not necessarily flee 
from it. Indeed, the correlation between the affective 
and the behavioral components of shyness is only a low 
to moderate one (Leary, 1983a). Thus, shyness can be 
conceptualized as a psychological syndrome consisting of 
the cognitive and affective experiences of social anxiety 
and the behavioral concomitants of social inhibition. 
3 
The present study concerns the first of these, i.e. , 
social anxiety, as it addresses the cognitive and 
affective rather than the behavioral aspects of shyness. 
What distinguishes social anxiety from other forms 
of anxiety? Anxiety is defined as "a cognitive and 
affective response characterized by apprehension about 
an impending, potentially negative outcome that one 
thinks one is unable to avert ... ,the impending threat 
real or imagined" (Schlenker & Leary, 1982, p. 642). It 
is the socially anxious individual's central concern 
about the potential or actual evaluative responses by 
others in social situations which differentiates social 
anxiety from nonsocial anxieties (Schlenker & Leary, 
1982) . 
People who frequently and intensely experience social 
anxiety, those who may be said to possess the trait of 
social anxiety, differ in several ways from people who 
less frequently and less intensely experience social 
anxiety (i.e. , those who may experience a state of social 
anxiety) . For example, as compared to people low in 
social anxiety, highly socially anxious people tend to 
be more concerned with making favorable impressions on 
others and to assume they make unfavorable impressions 
on others no matter how they behave and no matter how 
brief or extended the interaction (Greenberg, Pzyzyinski, 
4 
& Stine, 1985; Leary, 1983a, 1986b; Maddux, Norton, & 
Leary, in press; Leary, Kowalski, & Campbell, under 
review). 
Individuals who conceptualize themselves as "socially 
anxious" (i.e., have developed a self-schema or self-
construct revolving around the theme of chronic social 
anxiety) tend to experience social anxiety more 
frequently and intensely than others (distinctiveness), 
experience it across a wide variety of social situations 
(consistency), and maintain that other people see them 
as socially anxious (consensus) (Schlenker & Leary, 
1982). It has been suggested that social anxiety should 
be viewed on a continuum rather than a dichotomous 
dimension (e.g., Fatis, 1983). However, a social anxiety 
factor consistently emerges in factor analytic studies 
of anxiety and fear inventories (e.g., Crozier, 1986; 
Endler, Hunt, & Rosenstein, 1962; Fenigstein, Scheier, 
& Buss, 1975; Strahan, 1974). 
Several models of social anxiety have recently been 
generated which emphasize the role of cognitive processes 
in social anxiety (e.g., Beck & Emery, 1985; Buss, 1984; 
Carver & Scheier, 1986; Schlenker & Leary, 1982). 
Schlenker and Leary (Leary & Schlenker, 1981; Leary, 
1983b; Schlenker, 1987; Schlenker & Leary, 1982) have 
proposed a self-presentational theory which states that 
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people experience social anxiety when they believe they 
will be unable to make a desired impression upon others. 
In part, the impressions one makes on other people 
determine the rewards (e.g., positive attention) and 
punishments (e.g., negative attention, being ignored) one 
will receive from them. Consequently, motivation is 
directed to make "good" impressions upon others in order 
to obtain favorable interpersonal rewards (Schlenker, 
1980). If successful, managing one's self-presentation 
should result in positive interpersonal outcomes. Social 
anxiety results when the individual desires to make a 
certain impression upon other people, but holds there is 
little likelihood that she will successfully do so. This 
perceived discrepancy between one's goal and outcome 
expectancy is said to bear a direct relationship to one's 
experience of social anxiety. The more concerned one is 
about making a particular imprespion on others and/or the 
more consistent one's belief that he is unable to make 
those impressions, the more socially anxious this 
individual will tend to be. 
Leary and Atherton (1986) have recently refined a 
portion of the self-presentational model by applying 
Bandura's (1977) distinction between self-efficacy 
expectancies and outcome expectancies. 
self-efficacy theory, the subjective 
Borrowing from 
probability of 
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making a desired impression may be broken down into self-
presentational efficacy expectancies and self-
presentational outcome expectancies. A "self-
presentational efficacy expectancy" is the subjective 
probability that one can perform in a particular manner 
which is intended to convey a certain impression, whereas 
a "self-presentational outcome expectancy" is the 
subjective probability of actually making a particular 
impression given that one performs a certain behavior. 
Social anxiety should be minimal when both types of 
expectancies are high, as the person believes she or he 
can perform the self-presentational behavior and that it 
will result in the desired effect upon the audience. 
However, social anxiety will occur in situations in which 
either or both of the expectancies are low, assuming 
there is at least some motivation to make a particular 
impression. 
It is also proposed in the self-presentational model 
of social anxiety that an assessment process is activated 
in situations in which the self-presentational goal is 
important to the person or some impediment exists to 
one's social performance. If thic; assessment process 
leads to the expectation that one will be successful in 
creating the desired impression on the audience, then 
positive affect will result. If, on the other hand, the 
7 
assessment process results in the expectation that one 
will be unable to create the desired impression, then 
negative affect will ensue. This relationship between 
social anxiety and self-presentational concerns is 
supported in the literature (Arkin, Appelman, & Burger, 
1980; Arkin, Lake, & Baumgardner, 1986; Asendorpf, 1987; 
Baumgardner & Brownlee, 1987; Beck & Emery, 1985; Carver 
& Scheier, 1986; Leary, 1983a; Leary & Schlenker, 1981; 
Leary, Kowalski, & Campbell, under review; Schlenker, 
1987; Schlenker & Leary, 1982, 1985; Snyder & Smith, 
1986) • 
Research on the nature of the cognitions of socially 
anxious people reveals generalized assumptions that other 
people are critical and evaluative. Compared to less 
anxious persons, highly socially anxious people seem to 
approach interpersonal situations with lower expectations 
of being able to make favorable impressions on others. 
Interestingly, it does not appear that socially anxious 
individuals believe that other people make more favorable 
impressions than they themselves do; rather, highly 
socially anxious people seem to think that they and 
everyone else make less desirable impressions. Compare'i 
to highly socially anxious persons, it is those low in 
social anxiety who, though they agree with the highly 
socially anxious about the impressions most other people 
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make, believe they personally would be judged more 
positively than most others (Leary, Kowalski, & Campbell, 
under review) . Such a finding suggests the existence of 
some self-serving bias in less socially anxious 
individuals. The topic of self-serving bias will be 
considered in more depth later. 
Research has suggested that socially anxious subjects 
engage in self-defeating causal attributions for both 
positive and negative outcomes in hypothetical 
problematic (as determined by a survey of shy people, 
Zimbardo, 1977) events {Teglasi & Hoffman, 1982). It 
appears that studying excesses of specific types of 
cognitive activity (e.g.' self-defeating causal 
attributions, negative self-statements), rather than 
anxiety-induced deficits or the absence of positive 
coping talk, is more critical to our understanding of 
social anxiety and other anxiety states (Smith, Ingram, 
& Brehm, 1983; Teglasi & Hoffman, 1982). Such cognitive 
excesses, as revealed in self-focused, negative thought 
patterns that eventually result in dysphoric affect, have 
been labelled "anxious self-preoccupation" {Sarason, 
1975). It is further hypothesized that this anxious 
self-preoccupation includes cognitions of self-
derogation, concern about poor performance, self-doubt, 
and anticipation of loss of or harm to self-esteem. 
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Research has supported the existence of a relationship 
between social anxiety and these patterns of anxious 
self-preoccupation (Asendorpf, 1987; Cacioppo, Glass, & 
Merluzzi, 1979; Kanter & Goldfried, 1979; Sutton-Simon 
& Goldfried, 1979). 
Recently, studies have shown a relationship between 
social anxiety and depression (e.g., Pilkonis, Feldman, 
& Himmelhoch, 1981; Traub, 1983). Apparently, shy people 
tend to be more depressed than nonshy people (Pilkonis, 
Feldman, Himmelhoch, & Cornes, 1980; Traub, 1983). 
Additionally, Morris and Maddux (1985, cited in Leary, 
Maddux, & Kowalski, under review) have suggested that 
social anxiety and depression share similar patterns of 
expectancies about interpersonal abilities and goal 
attainment. Therefore, it seems important to take a look 
at the phenomenon of depression, as it may shed some 
light on our understanding of social anxiety. 
In the reformulated learned helplessness model, 
Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale (1978) have proposed an 
attributional model of depression in which depressive 
symptomatology is associated with a specific 
attributional style. Specifically, it has been 
demonstrated that depressives tend to attribute bad 
outcomes to internal, stable, and global causes, whereas 
nondepressives tend to attribute negative outcomes to 
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external, unstable, and specific causes (e.g., Anderson, 
Horowitz, & French, 1983; Raps, Peterson, Reinhard, 
Abramson, & Seligman, 1982; Seligman, Abramson, Semmel, 
& von Baeyer, 1979). When lack of control over an event 
with a negative outcome is attributed to internal 
factors, self-esteem suffers, as self-deprecating 
cognitions ensue. For example, an individual who fails 
an exam and blames it on his or her lack of intelligence 
would be making an internal attribution for the negative 
outcome of this event. One can easily imagine that such 
self-blaming cognitions would eventually take their toll 
on an individual's self-esteem. In fact, deficits in 
self-esteem have been identified as a major component of 
depression (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Beck, 
1967; Rehm, 1977). 
Self-esteem has also been associated with social 
anxiety, as a substantial negative correlation seems to 
exist between these two characteristics (Cheek & Buss, 
1981; Clark & Arkowitz, 1975; Leary, 1983a; Mccroskey, 
1977; Zimbardo, 1977) . Applying the attributional model, 
then, internal attributions for negative outcomes result 
in decreased self-esteem. Given that social anxiety is 
generally viewed as a socially undesirable quality 
(Zimbardo, 1977) I the individual who attributes 
unfavorable social encounters to his or her personal 
11 
social anxiousness will likely feel lowered self-esteem 
(Leary, 1983a) . 
People who describe themselves as shy do express a 
helpless inability to change their social anxiousness, 
a characteristic they do not like in themselves 
(Zimbardo, 1977). Furthermore, studies have supported 
the hypothesis that highly socially anxious individuals 
tend to make stable, internal attributions for their 
social failures (Anderson & Arnoult, 1985; Arkin, 
Appleman, & Burger, 1980; Girodo, Dotzenroth, & Stein, 
1981; Teglasi & Fagin, 1984; Teglasi & Hoffman, 1982). 
This tendency has been described as the reversal of the 
self-serving bias in causal attributions (Hope, Gansler, 
& Heimberg, 1989; Miller & Ross, 1975). That is, 
socially anxious people tend to attribute social failures 
to internal causes and to attribute social successes to 
external causes, thereby failing to self-enhance. Less 
socially anxious people, on the other hand, are likely 
to employ a self-serving bias in which they attribute 
more responsibility to themselves for positive than for 
negative outcomes (Arkin, Appelman, & Burger, 1980; 
Girodo, Dotzenroth, & Stein, 1981; Hope, Gansler, & 
Heimberg, 1989; Teglasi & Fagin, 1984; Teglasi & Hoffman, 
1982). As noted above, a similar attributional pattern 
has been found in depressed people in whom there seems 
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to be a failure to ascribe to self-enhancing attributions 
for successful outcomes (Abramson, Seligman, and 
Teasdale, 1978; Johnson, Petzel, Zarantonello, & Johnson, 
1985). Interestingly, the findings of Teglasi and 
Hoffman (1982) suggest that this attributional pattern 
for shy subjects is specific to social situations, as shy 
subjects assumed more responsibility than nonshy subjects 
for negative outcomes and less responsibility for 
positive outcomes in social-oriented but not in task-
oriented scenarios. 
In terms of Schlenker and Leary's (1982) self-
presentational model of social anxiety, the reversal of 
the self-serving bias in the socially anxious person can 
be explained as a viable strategy for impression 
management. If a social interaction is an apparent 
failure, it is better to take responsibility (that is, 
make an internal attribution) for the failure at that 
point rather than to make an additional mistake by not 
recognizing the initial failure. If the individual 
succeeds in a social interaction, she will not want to 
assume credit (that is, she will make an external 
attribution) for the success because others may then 
expect equally effective performance in future 
situations. Hence, damage to one's self-presentational 
goals in present and future interactions is minimized by 
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the reversal of the self-serving bias. The reversed 
self-serving bias, therefore, acts as a self-handicapping 
or self-protective strategy for the socially anxious 
individual (Arkin, Appelman, & Burger, 1980; Arkin, Lake, 
& Baumgardner, 1986; Beck & Emery, 1985; Hope, Gansler, 
& Heimberg, 1989; Leary & Atherton, 1986; Snyder & Smith, 
1983) • Further support for this self-presentational view 
of social anxiety is provided by a study in which 
subjects expected further personal interaction with 
another person (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Stine, 1985). 
It was found that subjects low in social anxiety 
presented a very positive self-image, whereas subjects 
high in social anxiety did not. Again, a parallel seems 
to exist between the self-serving bias in nondepressives 
and low socially anxious people and the self-denigrating 
bias in depressives and high socially anxious people 
(Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Stine, 1985). 
' In addition to studying attributional patterns in 
both depression and socially anxiety, researchers have 
investigated another aspect of thinking style, that is, 
personal beliefs. Much of the research in this area has 
been directed toward assessing irrational beliefs using 
the Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT; Jones, 1969) based on 
Ellis' (1962) rational-emotive model of emotional 
disturbance. A moderate correlation has been reported 
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between irrational beliefs and depression (Nelson, 1977). 
There is evidence that socially anxious individuals 
exhibit irrational beliefs regarding the necessity of 
others' approval (Ellis, 1962; Goldfried & Sobocinski, 
1975). Such a finding fits very well with one of the 
defining features of social anxiety, that is, the fear 
of being negatively evaluated by others (Beck & Emery, 
1985; Ingram & Kendall, 1987; Leary, 1983a; Smith, 
Ingram, & Brehm, 1983; Watson & Friend, 1969). In fact, 
a significant correlation has been found between the 
tendency to hold irrational beliefs and fear of negative 
evaluation (Davison, Feldman, & Osborn, 1984; Goldfried 
& Sobocinski, 1975) as well as social avoidance and 
distress (Sutton-Simon & Goldfried, 1979). In addition, 
social anxiety has also been found to correlate with 
other irrational beliefs, including anxious overconcern 
about future misfortune and high self-expectations 
(Goldfried & Sobocinski, 1975). However, other 
researchers (e.g., Craighead, Kimball, & Rehak, 1979; 
Glass, Merluzzi, Biever, & Larsen, 1982) have either 
failed to replicate some of the findings or have found 
confusing results (e.g., Deffenbacher, Zwemer, Whisman, 
Hill, & Sloan, 1986, whose results did not converge in 
terms of irrational beliefs operative in fear of negative 
evaluation and in social avoidance and distress) with 
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regard to the relationship between irrational beliefs and 
social anxiety. Arnkoff and Glass (1989) propose that 
the mixed results in this area may exist because the most 
widely used beliefs measure, the Irrational Beliefs Test 
(Jones, 1969), assesses a general tendency toward 
irrationality as opposed to specific beliefs about social 
interaction. 
With regard to Schlenker and Leary's (1982) self-
presentational model of social anxiety, the tendency to 
ascribe to irrational beliefs helps to explain the 
socially anxious person's sensitivity to interpersonal 
evaluation and motivation toward self-handicapping 
strategies (such as the reversed self-serving bias). In 
particular, the irrational belief concerning the 
necessity of others' approval fits with the self-
presentational model's proposal that greater social 
anxiety will result from greater importance afforded to 
' the standard or goal of a social interaction. In 
addition, the irrational belief pertaining to high self-
expectations also makes sense from the self-
presentational model, as this view states that the degree 
of social anxiety one experiences will be inversely 
related to one's expectations for the outcome of the 
social situation. If one has very high expectations for 
the outcome of a social interaction, there is increased 
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likelihood of a perceived discrepancy between one's goal 
and expectancy in the situation. Hence, more intense 
social anxiety might be expected from persons who 
maintain irrational beliefs, especially those related to 
high personal expectations and the need for approval from 
others. 
Up to this point, two aspects of cognitive 
functioning, attributional styles and irrational beliefs, 
have been considered with regard to depression and social 
anxiety. Another cognitive construct which has gained 
research attention, particularly in the area of 
depression, deals with cognitive distortions. Cognitive 
distortions have been described as involving "active 
information processing on the part of the person but 
include inaccurate or 'crooked' processing" (Ingram & 
Kendall, 1987, p. 526). Previous research has indicated 
that depressed individuals engage in specific cognitive 
; 
distortions which commonly overemphasize negative 
information to the relative exclusion of the positive 
(Beck, 1967, 1970; Chaban & Robins, 1986; Hammen & 
Krantz, 1976; Krantz & Hammen, 1979). Such biased 
interpretation and evaluation only serve to perpetuate 
and/or increase depressed mood. It has been hypothesized 
that these dysfunctional cognitions are at the very core 
of the complex phenomenon of depression. 
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Beck (1967, 1970, 1974), Seligman (1974, 1975), 
Hammen and Glass (1975), Abramson, et al. (1978) and 
others have proposed cognitive explanations which 
emphasize dysfunctional perceptions and interpretations 
of information as they contribute to the development and 
maintenance of depressed mood. Beck's (1970) view, 
sometimes referred to as the cognitive distortion model 
of depression (e.g., McLean, 1976), is that depressed 
people tend to distort information as a result of 
committing certain cognitive errors: (1) arbitrary 
inference--the process of reaching a conclusion without 
supporting or in spite of contradictory evidence; (2) 
overgeneralization--the process of reaching a general 
conclusion based on a single event, conceptualizing the 
overall experience based on this detail, thereby ignoring 
any other more salient aspects of the situation; (3) 
magnification--the propensity to exaggerate the 
significance or meaning of an event; (4) cognitive 
def iciency--the tendency to disregard or fail to 
integrate an important aspect of life experience. Rather 
than bizarre and rare occurrences, these cognitive 
distortions (or dysfunctional cognitions) more likely 
appear to be exaggerations of fairly typical responses 
in situations. Evidently, depressives characteristically 
perceive and interpret information in maladaptive ways 
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(Beck, 1970; Hammen & Krantz, 1976; Krantz & Hammen, 
1979). Certainly, dysfunctional cognitions per se are 
not exclusive to depression, as other forms of 
psychopathology seem to be affected by cognitive 
distortions (Goldfried & Robins, 1983; Mahoney, 1974; 
Shapiro, 1965). As discussed above, the socially anxious 
individual can be characterized by his anxious self-
preoccupation which entails various dysfunctional 
cognitions about the self. Indeed, the research reviewed 
here has demonstrated an important link between 
maladaptive cognitions and social anxiety (e.g. , 
Cacioppo, Glass & Merluzzi, 1979; Glass, Merluzzi, 
Biever, & Larsen, 1982; Goldfried & Sobocinski, 1975; 
Gormally, Sipps, Raphael, Edwin, & Varvil-Weld, 1981; 
Smith, Ingram, & Brehm, 1983; Turner, Beidel, & Larkin, 
1986). However, studies to date have not looked at the 
existence of depressogenic cognitive distortions in 
socially anxious people. 
The concepts of attributional patterns and irrational 
beliefs reviewed above share a common approach to 
understanding the phenomenon of social anxiety, that is, 
they are cognitive constructs which attempt to address 
people's thinking styles. Furthermore, the findings in 
each of these areas with regard to social anxiety seem 
to be compatible. A third cognitive construct, cognitive 
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distortion, was discussed with regard to research on 
depression. In further delineating a cognitive framework 
for understanding social anxiety, it would be worthwhile 
to study the potential existence of cognitive distortions 
in socially anxious people. Indeed, given the evidence 
for some degree of correlation between depression and 
social anxiety, similar thinking styles may be shared 
between depressed and socially anxious individuals. 
A fair amount of research has investigated 
attributional patterns in socially anxious people. 
Although studies have also looked at irrational beliefs 
in social anxiety, the most frequently used measure of 
irrational beliefs (Irrational Beliefs Test; Jones, 1969) 
has been criticized for lacking discriminant validity 
(Smith, in press, cited in Arnkoff & Glass, 1989). 
Certainly, cognitive schemata can be assessed through 
beliefs or self-statements (assuming a suitable measure 
, 
can be used). However, there may be advantages to using 
methods which do not rely as much on one's awareness of 
his or her cognitive processes (Arnkoff & Glass, 1989), 
that is, methods which depend largely on self-report 
(Smith, in press, cited in Arnkoff & Glass, 1989). Such 
a view is substantiated by evidence that individuals may 
not have direct introspective access to relevant aspects 
of their own higher-order cognitive processes (Nisbett 
20 
& Wilson, 1977). Hence, the present study will take a 
different approach to studying the phenomenon of social 
anxiety, as it will address cognitive distortion using 
measures which do not depend greatly on self-report of 
beliefs or self-statements. 
In sum, research indicates that socially anxious 
persons seem to engage in cognitive activities that are 
distorted in some way. The present study is designed to 
investigate cognitive distortions as they occur in 
socially anxious individuals. More specifically, given 
the existence of dysfunctional cognitions independently 
found in both depression and in social anxiety, and given 
the apparent relationship between these two psychological 
phenomena, do socially anxious people cognitively distort 
in ways similar to depressives? If so, there are 
important therapeutic implications for highly socially 
anxious people. Little research has addressed the role 
' 
of cognitive distortions per se in social anxiety, and 
none has looked specifically at evaluating the relative 
contributions of social anxiety versus depression to 
cognitive distortions. 
Schlenker and Leary's (1982) self-presentational 
model is compatible with the (hypothesized, at this 
point) existence of depressogenic cognitive distortion 
in socially anxious individuals. If information from 
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social interactions tends to get distorted (as Beck 
(1970) describes, for example, positive aspects of a 
social situation are minimized, whereas negative aspects 
are magnified) by the socially anxious individual, then 
there is an increased likelihood of greater perceived 
discrepancy between the individual's goal versus his or 
her expectancies (i.e., self-presentational outcome 
expectancies and/or self-presentational efficacy 
expectancies). This greater discrepancy will then result 
in increased social anxiety. Further, the negative phase 
of assessment process described by Schlenker and Leary 
may also be perpetuated by cognitive distortions and may 
consequently lead to an increase in negative affect. 
In the present investigation, a cognitive distortion 
measure previously used in depression research, the 
Cognitive Distortion Questionnaire ( CDQ; Krantz & Hammen, 
1979), which consists of stories followed by questions 
? 
with different types of responses, was given to subjects 
possessing varying degrees of social anxiety and fear of 
negative evaluation. A portion of the possible responses 
to the story questions in the CDQ exemplify the types of 
cognitive distortion described by Beck (1970). In 
previous research, depressives, as compared to 
nondepressives, have evidenced greater cognitive 
distortion, as shown by their selection of more 
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depressed-distorted responses on the Cognitive Distortion 
Questionnaire (Krantz & Hammen, 1979). In addition, it 
has been suggested that this pattern of depressogenic 
cognitive distortion is not influenced by situational 
factors, as the different story themes, either "social-
interpersonal" or "achievement-competence", in the CDQ 
had no apparent influence on the pattern of findings in 
depressed subjects (Krantz & Hammen, 1979; Shaw & Dobson, 
1981) . 
The central hypothesis of the present study predicts 
that more highly socially anxious subjects (as determined 
by scores on the Social Avoidance and Distress scale and 
the Fear of Negative Evaluation scale), compared to less 
socially anxious subjects, select more depressed-
distorted responses on the Cognitive Distortion 
Questionnaire. It might be expected that socially 
anxious subjects would respond to events differently 
; 
based on whether or not there is an interpersonal aspect 
to the situation. Close examination of the stories used 
in the CDQ questionnaire reveals that all involve some 
interpersonal component with or without an achievement 
component. Therefore, a set of stories involving 
achievement themes without an interpersonal component 
were also constructed and presented to subjects. Given 
the interpersonal aspect of social anxiety, it is 
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predicted that more highly socially anxious subjects will 
choose more depressed-distorted responses in stories with 
interpersonal themes (i.e., the interpersonal or 
interpersonal-achievement stories). Level of depression 
will be covaried out in order to determine if social 
anxiety contributes to cognitive distortion independently 
of depression. 
METHOD 
subjects 
One-hundred-twenty-three undergraduate psychology 
students at Loyola University of Chicago were each given 
a packet of questionnaires designed to assess social 
anxiety, depression, trait anxiety, and cognitive 
distortion. Data were analyzed on 114 subjects, as nine 
subjects returned incomplete questionnaires. 
Approximately three-quarters of the sample were female 
and one-quarter was male. In return for their voluntary 
participation in this study, students received extra 
credit which could be applied to their psychology class. 
Materials 
The packet of self-report questionnaires administered 
to all subjects included the following: Social 
Avoidance and Distress scale (SAD; Watson & Friend, 
1969); Fear of Negative Evaluation scale (FNE; Watson & 
Friend, 1969) ; State-Trait Anxiety Inventory--Trait form 
(STAI--Trait; Speilberger, Gorusch, & Lushene, 1968); 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, 
Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961); Cognitive Distortion 
Questionnaire (CDQ; Krantz & Hammen, 1979) with 
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additional items developed for this study. 
The SAD scale is a 28-true/false-item measure of 
dispositional social anxiousness. It is divided into two 
subscales, social avoidance (a behavioral concomitant of 
social anxiety) and social distress (a cognitive 
concomitant of social anxiety). For each item, subjects 
indicate "true" if the statement is true or mostly true 
in describing themselves, and they indicate "false" if 
the statement is false or mostly false in describing 
themselves. An example of a statement from the social 
avoidance subscale is "I try to avoid situations which 
force me to be very sociable"; an example from the social 
distress subscale is "I usually feel relaxed when I am 
with a group of people. " Statements are worded both 
positively and negatively. The SAD has demonstrated 
adequate reliability (ranging from +.68 to +.79 for test-
retest reliability) and strong criterion and construct 
; 
validity (Watson & Friend, 1969). 
The FNE is comprised of 30-true/false-items which 
assess the fear of loss of social approval, e.g. , "I 
rarely worry about seeming foolish to others." Worded 
in both positive and negative directions, students 
indicate whether each statement is true (or mostly true) 
or false (or mostly false) in describing themselves. The 
FNE possesses acceptable reliability (test-retest 
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reliabilities range between +.78 and +.96) and strong 
criterion and construct validity (Watson & Friend, 1969). 
The STAI--Trait form is a 20-item measure of general 
anxiety as a personality trait. On a four-point scale 
with 1 meaning "almost never" to 4 meaning "almost 
always", subjects respond to each statement according to 
how they generally feel. An example of a statement from 
the STAI--Trait form is "I become tense and upset when 
I think about my present concerns. " Statements are 
worded in both a positive and a negative direction. 
Alpha reliabilities for undergraduates on the STAI--Trait 
Form are .89 to .90 (Spielberger, Gorusch, & Lushene, 
1968). 
The BDI is a 21-item questionnaire designed to assess 
level of depression. Items pertain to various somatic, 
cognitive, behavioral, and affective signs of depression. 
For each item, subjects are given four statements 
; 
(assigned a score from O to 3) from which they choose the 
one that best describes how they have been feeling in the 
past week. Beck (1967) has indicated that scores of ten 
or above are indicative of clinically significant levels 
of depression. 
The CDQ is a story task in which participants select 
from among various response alternatives the one that 
most approximates their assessment of the character's 
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likely response. Six brief stories are presented that 
involve a character (the same sex as the subject) in a 
potentially problematic situation common to this college-
age group, such as being home in the dorm on a Friday 
night or making a class presentation in which one hoped 
to perform well. After each story, there are three or 
four questions followed by four possible responses. 
These questions pertain to the character's feelings, 
thoughts, and expectations in the particular situation. 
The four possible responses include one each of the 
following types of responses: depressed-distorted, 
depressed-nondistorted, nondepressed-distorted, and 
nondepressed-nondistorted. Distortion is considered to 
occur when logically unjustified conclusions are made 
from the information presented. In this way, the CDQ 
assesses biased cognitions. As an example from the CDQ, 
one story involves Peggy (or Paul) who was described as 
having joined a particular organization and was 
encouraged by friends to run for president of the 
organization. She runs but loses the election. Subjects 
are then instructed to "put yourself in Peggy's (Paul's) 
place, trying as vividly as you can to imaging what she 
(he) probably thought and felt." Following this 
instruction, there are a series of questions, such as: 
"When you first heard you'd lost, you immediately: (a) 
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feel bad and imagine you've lost by a landslide 
(depressed-distorted); (b) shrug it off as unimportant 
(nondepressed-distorted); (c) feel sad and wonder what 
the total counts were (depressed-nondistorted); (d) shrug 
it off, feeling I've tried as hard as I could 
(nondepressed-nondistorted). Further evidence for 
convergent and discriminant validity of the CDQ is 
provided by Frost and Macinnis (1983). A copy of the 
cognitive distortion questionnaire (the male version) 
including the additional set of scenarios developed for 
this study appears in the Appendix. 
As three of the stories are strictly interpersonal 
situations (e.g., meeting new people at a job) and three 
are interpersonally-involved achievement situations 
(e.g., making a presentation in front of a class) in the 
CDQ, three additional stories were developed for this 
study involving achievement situations with no direct 
interpersonal component (e.g., receiving LSAT scores in 
the mail). Inclusion of items that are not 
interpersonally involved should provide a more stringent 
test of social anxiety effects. The achievement stories 
follow the same format as the remainder of the CDQ 
stories. Based upon the unanimous agreement of six 
raters blind to the hypotheses, responses to the 
questions following each story were categorized as 
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depressed-distorted, depressed-nondistorted, 
nondepressed-distorted, or nondepressed-nondistorted. 
Procedure 
Subjects completed a packet of questionnaires which 
included the SAD scale, the FNE scale, the CDQ (with 
three additional stories involving achievement/no 
interpersonal themes), the STAI-Trait form, and the BDI. 
Orders of presentation of the measures were 
counterbalanced so as to eliminate order effects. 
Additional measures were given but not analyzed as part 
of this study. 
In an effort to obtain a "pure" measure of social 
anxiety, the effects of depression and generalized 
anxiety are controlled for by covarying out results from 
the BDI and STAI-Trait questionnaires. Data were 
analyzed to test the hypothesis that socially anxious 
people cognitively distort in ways similar to depressives 
and to determine whether such distortions are maintained 
in socially anxious people when the relative effect of 
depression is partialled out of the complex relationship 
between social anxiety, depression, and depressogenic 
distortions. 
RESULTS 
Two 3 x 3 repeated measures designs were employed 
using level (high vs. medium vs. low) of social anxiety 
and fear of negative evaluation as the between-subjects 
factor and type of CDQ scenario (interpersonal, 
achievement, interpersonal-achievement) as the within-
subjects factor. Repeated measures analyses of variance 
(ANOVAs) were computed on each of the dependent variables 
(i.e. , percentage of the total number of responses 
corresponding to each of the four possible CDQ responses: 
depressed-distorted, depressed-nondistorted, 
nondepressed-distorted, and nondepressed-nondistorted) . 
Repeated measures analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) were 
also performed using depression and trait anxiety as 
covariates. Whenever the interaction term or main effect 
terms in the ANOVAs or ANCOVAs were significant at the 
. 05 level, simple effects analyses were performed to 
determine where the significant effects existed. 
Scheffe's test was calculated to determine pairwise mean 
differences among individual cells and marginals when 
indicated. Scheffe's test was used to follow up 
significant main effects and to follow up significant 
simple effects analyses resulting from an interaction. 
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In cases in which a trend (R <.10) was evident, Scheffe's 
test was also employed to probe the results. Scores on 
the SAD ranged from O to 27 with a mean of 8.62 and a 
standard deviation of 6.47. Scores on the FNE ranged 
from o to 30 with a mean of 14. 33 and a standard 
deviation of 8.32. Based on their scores on the SAD and 
the FNE, subjects in the present study were divided into 
high (SAD: 11 - 27, n = 33; FNE: 20 - 30; n = 36), medium 
(SAD: 5 - 10, n = 42; FNE: 11 - 19, n = 39), and low 
(SAD: O - 4, n = 39; FNE: O - 10, n = 39) in social 
anxiety and in fear of negative evaluation. 
The Beck Depression Inventory ( BDI) was used in order 
to covary out depression in the ANCOVAs. The mean BDI 
score was 8.42 with a standard deviation of 9.05 and a 
range of O to 51. The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory--
Trait Form was employed as a measure of trait anxiety 
which was also covaried out. With a range of 21 to 67, 
the mean STAI-Trait score was '41.16 with a standard 
deviation of 10.26. 
The central hypotheses of this study concern the 
depressed-distorted responses on the CDQ. Therefore, the 
results will be organized so that each of the four types 
of responses (depressed-distorted, depressed-
nondepressed-distorted, nondepressed-nondistorted, 
nondistorted) are considered separately. Specific 
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hypotheses were not made for the depressed-nondistorted, 
nondepressed-distorted, or nondepressed-nondistorted 
responses. However, secondary predictions were generated 
based on type of scenario (interpersonal, interpersonal-
achievement, achievement), and relevant results will be 
addressed as they occur. 
DEPRESSED-DISTORTED RESPONSES 
Social Avoidance and Distress (SAD) scale 
Observed and adjusted cell means for the percentages 
of depressed-distorted responses in the SAD condition are 
shown in Table 1. It was expected that subjects higher 
in social anxiety (as measured by the SAD) would give 
more depressed-distorted responses than subjects lower 
in social anxiety. An analysis of variance performed on 
the percentage of subjects' depressed-distorted responses 
revealed a significant interaction of SAD by type of 
scenario, E (4,222) = 3.47, Q = .009, and a significant 
main effect of SAD, E (2,111) = 3i.10, Q < .0001. Simple 
effects analyses of the significant interaction term 
indicated that, across all three types of scenarios 
(interpersonal, interpersonal-achievement, achievement), 
high SAD subjects (M's= 21.76 for interpersonal, 15.12 
for interpersonal achievement, 18.85 for achievement) 
gave a significantly higher percentage of depressed-
distorted responses as compared to medium SAD subjects 
Table 1. 
percentages 
function of 
FNE. 
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Observed and adjusted cell means of the 
of depressed-distorted responses as a 
type of CDQ scenario and level of SAD and 
TYPE OF CDQ SCENARIO 
INTERPERSONAL INTERPERSONAL/ 
ACHIEVEMENT 
ACHIEVEMENT 
Observed 
Means 
High SAD 
High FNE 
Adjusted 
Means 
High SAD 
High FNE 
Observed 
Means 
Medium SAD. 
Medium FNE 
Adjusted 
Means 
Medium SAD 
Medium FNE 
Observed 
Means 
Low SAD 
Low FNE 
Adjusted 
Means 
Low SAD 
Low FNE 
21.76 
17.42 
17.10 
12.58 
4.81 
6.85 
6.33 
7.45 
3.82 
4.49 
6.95 
8.71 
15.12 
14.86 
11.96 
12.34 
7.07 
5.77 
8.15 
6.05 
6.31 
7.23 
8.39 
9.47 
18.85 
14.58 
14.98 
10.61 
5.26 
6.64 
6.62 
7.09 
3.44 
4.95 
5.94 
8.48 
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(M's= 4.81, 7.07, 5.26) and to low SAD subjects (M's= 
3.82, 6.31, 3.44), R'S< .01 by Scheffe's test. 
An analysis of covariance on the percentage of 
subjects' depressed-distorted responses revealed a 
significant main effect of SAD, E (2,109) = 9.14, R < 
.0001, and a significant interaction of SAD by type of 
scenario, E (4,221) = 3.20, R = .014. Follow up analyses 
of the significant interaction term showed that subjects 
in the high SAD condition (M = 17.10) chose a 
significantly higher percentage of depressed-distorted 
responses than subjects in either the medium SAD (M = 
6.33) or low SAD (M = 6.95) conditions, R's < .01 by 
Scheffe's test. This pattern held for the interpersonal 
scenarios and the achievement scenarios but not for the 
interpersonal-achievement scenarios. Neither level of 
depression nor trait anxiety were significant covariates, 
R'S > .05. 
' In short, results of both the ANOVA and AN COVA 
supported the hypothesis that more highly socially 
anxious subjects would report a significantly higher 
percentage of depressed-distorted responses than less 
socially anxious subjects. Neither depression nor trait 
anxiety significantly influenced the pattern of results. 
Fear of Negative Evaluation CFNEl scale 
Observed and adjusted cell means for the percentages 
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of depressed-distorted responses in the FNE condition are 
given in Table 1. It was predicted that subjects higher 
in fear of negative evaluation (as assessed by the FNE) 
would report more depressed-distorted responses than 
subjects lower in fear of negative evaluation. An 
analysis of variance computed on the percentage of 
subjects' depressed-distorted responses revealed a 
significant main effect of FNE, ~ (2,111) = 13.34, 2 < 
.0001. Simple effects analyses showed high FNE subjects 
(M = 15,62) reported a significantly higher percentage 
of depressed-distorted responses than subjects in either 
the medium FNE (M = 6.42) or low FNE (M = 5.56) 
conditions, 2's < .05 by Scheffe's test. 
Although the ANCOVA performed on the percentage of 
depressed-distorted responses showed a significant main 
effect of FNE (~ (2,109) = 3.58, 2 = .031), simple 
effects analyses failed to reveal any significant 
l differences among the FNE levels. However, inspection 
of the FNE group means suggests that the effect appears 
to be pulled primarily by subjects in the high FNE 
condition (M = 11.84) who differed from the medium FNE 
(M = 6.86) and low FNE (M = 8.89) subjects. Depression 
was not significant as a covariate (2 > .05), although 
trait anxiety approached significance as a covariate (2 
= . 07) • 
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Thus, the ANOVA results confirmed the hypothesized 
prediction that subjects' higher in fear of negative 
evaluation would give a significantly greater percentage 
of depressed-distorted responses compared to subjects 
lower in fear of negative evaluation. Al though the 
follow-up analyses of the significant ANCOVA did not find 
any significant differences, the FNE group means appear 
to follow a pattern similar to that found with the ANOVA, 
that is, high FNE subjects reported a greater percentage 
of depressed-distorted responses than medium or low FNE 
subjects. Depression level did not affect the pattern 
of results. Given the near-significance of trait anxiety 
as a covariate, it might be tentatively suggested that 
trait anxiety may play a role in subjects' tendency to 
give more depressed-distorted responses. 
DEPRESSED-NONDISTORTED RESPONSES 
Social Avoidance and Distress (SAD) scale 
, 
Table 2 shows the observed and adjusted cell means 
for the percentages of depressed-nondistorted responses 
with the SAD scale. An ANOVA calculated on the 
percentage of depressed-nondistorted responses revealed 
a significant main effect of type of scenario, E (2,222) 
= 58.91, £ < .0001, and an effect of SAD which approached 
significance, E (2,111) = 2.63, £ = .077. Simple effects 
analyses of the main effect of scenario showed that 
Table 2. 
percentages 
function of 
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Observed and adjusted cell means of the 
of depressed-nondistorted responses as a 
type of CDQ scenario and level of SAD and 
TYPE OF CDQ SCENARIO 
INTERPERSONAL INTERPERSONAL/ 
ACHIEVEMENT 
ACHIEVEMENT 
Observed 
Means 
High SAD 
High FNE 
Adjusted 
Means 
High SAD 
High FNE 
Observed 
Means 
Medium SAD 
Medium FNE 
Adjusted 
Means 
Medium SAD 
Medium FNE 
Observed 
Means 
Low SAD 
Low FNE 
Adjusted 
Means 
Low SAD 
Low FNE 
26.76 
26.53 
23.83 
24.14 
25.93 
2·4. 54 
26.89 
24.85 
20.79 
22.33 
22.76 
24.41 
27.94 
28.11 
24.30 
25.21 
26.64 
26.10 
27.75 
26.53 
20.21 
20.49 
22.73 
22.96 
38.15 
39.39 
36.56 
37.86 
45.45 
43.62 
45.79 
43.94 
40.51 
41. 77 
41.76 
42.97 
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subjects reported a significantly higher percentage of 
depressed-nondistorted responses in the achievement 
scenarios CM = 41.65) as compared either to the 
interpersonal scenarios CM = 24.41) or to the 
interpersonal-achievement scenarios CM= 24.82), R's < 
.01 by Scheffe's test. Analyses which probed the SAD 
trend revealed no significant pairwise differences among 
the SAD levels, R'S > .05. 
An ANCOVA on the percentage of depressed-
nondistorted responses showed a significant main effect 
of type of scenario, E C2,221) = 46.21, 12 < .0001. 
Although an effect of SAD approached significance CE 
C2,109) = 2.57, R = .081), no significant SAD differences 
were obtained when this trend was probed, R's > • 05. 
Simple effects analyses of the significant main effect 
of scenario revealed that subjects gave a significantly 
higher percentage of depressed-nondistorted responses in 
} 
the achievement scenarios CM= 41.37) as compared to the 
interpersonal scenarios CM = 2 4. 4 9) or the interpersonal-
achievement scenarios CM= 24.93), R's< .01. Although 
depression did not emerge as a significant covariate CJ2 
> .05), trait anxiety was significant as a covariate, 12 
= • 029. Hence, trait anxiety accounted for a significant 
portion of the variance in subjects' depressed-
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nondistorted responses. 
For the SAD conditions, both the ANOVA and ANCOVA 
revealed similar results with regard to subjects 
reporting a significantly greater percentage of 
depressed-nondistorted responses in the scenarios with 
an achievement-only theme as compared to either an 
interpersonal theme or interpersonal-achievement theme. 
This pattern of results did not depend on either the 
significant covariate of trait anxiety or the 
nonsignif icant covariate of depression. 
Fear of Negative Evaluation CFNE) scale 
The observed and adjusted cell means for the 
percentages of depressed-nondistorted responses with the 
FNE scale are shown in Table 2 . An ANOVA on the 
percentage of depressed-nondistorted responses revealed 
a significant main effect of type of scenario, ~ (2,222) 
= 60.93, R < .0001. Simple effects analyses showed that, 
compared to scenarios with an interpersonal theme (M = 
2 4. 41) or an interpersonal-achievement theme (M = 2 4 • 8 2) , 
subjects reported a significantly greater percentage of 
depressed-nondistorted responses in scenarios with an 
achievement theme (M =41.65), R's < .01 by Scheffe's 
test. 
An ANCOVA performed on the percentage of depressed-
nondistorted responses showed a significant main effect 
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of type of scenario, E (2,221) = 47.47, 12 < .0001. 
Simple effects analyses revealed that subjects chose a 
significantly higher percentage of depressed-nondistorted 
responses when they read achievement scenarios (M = 
41.59) than when they read interpersonal scenarios (M = 
24.47) or interpersonal-achievement scenarios (M = 
24.90), 12's < .01 by Scheffe's test. Whereas depression 
was not a significant covariate (12 > .05), trait anxiety 
did reach significance as a covariate (12 = .031). 
With regard to the FNE conditions, the same pattern 
of results emerged from both the ANOVA and ANCOVA, as a 
significantly higher percentage of depressed-nondistorted 
responses was chosen when subjects read scenarios with 
achievement themes as compared either to interpersonal 
or interpersonal-achievement themes. These results were 
found even after trait anxiety (the only significant 
covariate in this case) was covaried out. 
NONDEPRESSED-DISTORTED RESPONSES 7 
Social Avoidance and Distress (SAD) scale 
The observed and adjusted cell means for the 
percentages of nondepressed-distorted responses with the 
SAD scale are given in Table 3. An ANOVA calculated on 
the percentage of nondepressed-distorted responses showed 
a significant main effect of type of scenario, E (2,222) 
= 10.05, 12 < .0001, and a significant interaction of SAD 
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Table 3. Observed and adjusted cell means of the 
percentages of nondepressed-distorted responses as a 
function of type of CDQ scenario and level of SAD and 
FNE. 
TYPE OF CDQ SCENARIO 
INTERPERSONAL INTERPERSONAL/ 
ACHIEVEMENT 
Observed 
Means 
High SAD 
High FNE 
Adjusted 
Means 
High SAD 
High FNE 
Observed 
Means 
Medium SAD 
Medium FNE 
Adjusted 
Means 
Medium SAD 
Medium FNE 
Observed 
Means 
Low SAD 
Low FNE 
Adjusted 
Means 
Low SAD 
Low FNE 
11.09 
11.61 
12.05 
13.31 
14.14 
14.77 
14.03 
14.43 
14.31 
13.44 
13.47 
12.08 
13.39 
14.03 
12.72 
14.15 
13.07 
11.54 
13.45 
11.42 
10.85 
11.77 
11.13 
11.77 
ACHIEVEMENT 
11.55 
9.19 
10.66 
8.39 
7.07 
6.92 
7.58 
6.89 
4.80 
6.77 
5.18 
7.60 
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by type of scenario, I (4,222) = 2.54, R = .041. Follow-
up analyses revealed the following significant results: 
(1) for subjects low on the SAD scale, a significantly 
greater percentage of nondepressed-distorted responses 
was given in the interpersonal scenarios (M = 14.31) and 
the interpersonal-achievement scenarios (M = 10.85) as 
compared to the achievement scenarios (M = 4.80), R < 
.01 and R < .05 respectively by Scheffe's test; (2) for 
subjects who scored in the medium SAD range, a 
significantly higher percentage of nondepressed-distorted 
responses was reported in the interpersonal scenarios (M 
= 14.14) and the interpersonal-achievement scenarios (M 
= 13.07) than in the achievement scenarios (M = 7.07), 
R < .01 and R < .025 respectively by Scheffe's test. No 
significant differences were obtained for high SAD among 
the different scenarios (R > .05). 
An ANCOVA on the percentage of nondepressed-
, 
distorted responses revealed a significant interaction 
of SAD by type of scenario, I (4,221) = 2.52, R .042, 
and a significant main effect of type of scenario, I 
(2,221) = 8.56, R < .0001. The following significant 
results emerged from the follow up analyses: ( 1) for 
low SAD subjects, a significantly higher percentage of 
nondepressed-distorted responses was reported in 
scenarios with an interpersonal theme (M = 13.47) or an 
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interpersonal-achievement theme (M = 11.13) versus 
scenarios with an achievement-only theme (M = 5.18), 2 
< .01 and 2 < .05 respectively by Scheffe's test; (2) 
for medium SAD subjects, a significantly greater 
percentage of nondepressed-distorted responses was given 
in those scenarios with either an interpersonal theme (M 
= 14. 03) or an interpersonal-achievement theme (M = 
13. 45) as compared to an achievement-only theme (M = 
7.58), 2 < .025 and 2 < .05 respectively by Scheffe's 
test. There were no significant differences in the high 
SAD subjects across the different scenarios (2 > .05). 
Both depression (2 = .001) and trait anxiety (2 = .004) 
reached significance as covariates. 
Regarding the social anxiety conditions, the ANOVA 
and ANCOVA revealed the same pattern of results in which 
low and medium SAD subjects gave a significantly greater 
percentage of nondepressed-distorted responses in 
interpersonal and interpersonat-achievement scenarios 
than in achievement-only scenarios. Although both 
depression and trait anxiety were significant covariates, 
they did not alter the pattern of results. Fear of 
Negative Evaluation CFNE) scale 
Table 3 contains the observed and adjusted cell 
means for the percentages of nondepressed-distorted 
responses with the FNE scale. Results obtained from an 
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ANOVA performed on the percentage of nondepressed-
distorted responses showed a significant main effect of 
type of scenario, ~ (2,222) = 10.82, Q < .0001. Simple 
effects analyses revealed that a significantly greater 
percentage of nondepressed-distorted responses was chosen 
when subjects read scenarios with an interpersonal theme 
(M = 13.32) or an interpersonal-achievement theme (M = 
12.40) as compared to an achievement theme (M = 7.59), 
Q's < .01 by Scheffe's test. 
An ANCOVA calculated on the percentage of 
nondepressed-distorted responses revealed a significant 
main effect of type of scenario, ~ (2,221) = 9.24, Q < 
. 0001. Simple effects analyse~ showed that a 
significantly higher percentage of nondepressed-distorted 
responses was reported in the interpersonal scenarios (M 
= 13.27) and the interpersonal-achievement scenarios (M 
= 14.45) versus the achievement scenarios (M = 7.63), Q's 
< .01 by Scheffe's test. Both depression (Q = .001) and 
trait anxiety (Q = .005) were significant covariates. 
For the FNE conditions, the same pattern of results 
emerged from the ANOVA and ANCOVA and showed that a 
significantly higher percentage of nondepressed-distorted 
responses was reported in the scenarios with 
interpersonal or interpersonal-achievement themes as 
compared to achievement themes. This pattern held even 
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after depression and trait anxiety were covaried out. 
NONDEPRESSED-NONDISTORTED RESPONSES 
social Avoidance and Distress (SAD) scale 
Table 4 shows the observed and adjusted cell means 
for the percentages of nondepressed-nondistorted 
responses with the SAD scale. An ANOVA performed on the 
percentage of nondepressed-nondistorted responses showed 
a significant main effect of SAD, E C2,lll) = 17.05, R 
< . 0001, and a significant main effect of type of 
scenario, E C2,222) = 18.73, R < .0001. Simple effects 
analyses of the main effect of SAD revealed that low SAD 
subjects CM = 58.18) reported a significantly greater 
percentage of nondepressed-nondistorted responses than 
medium SAD subjects CM = 50.04) who, in turn, reported 
a significantly greater percentage of nondepressed-
nondistorted responses than high SAD subjects CM = 
38 .13) , R's < . 05 by Scheffe' s test. Simple effects 
. ' . analyses of the main effect of scenario showed that a 
significantly greater percentage of nondepressed-
nondistorted responses was given in interpersonal 
scenarios CM = 52.89) and interpersonal-achievement 
scenarios CM = 53.25) than in achievement scenarios CM 
= 42.00), R's< .01 by Scheffe's test. 
Results obtained from an ANCOVA on the percentage 
of nondepressed-nondistorted responses showed a 
Table 4. 
percentages 
function of 
FNE. 
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Observed and adjusted cell means of the 
of nondepressed-nondistorted responses as a 
type of CDO scenario and level of SAD and 
TYPE OF CDQ SCENARIO 
INTERPERSONAL INTERPERSONAL/ 
ACHIEVEMENT 
ACHIEVEMENT 
Observed 
Means 
High SAD 
High FNE 
Adjusted 
Means 
High SAD 
High FNE 
Observed 
Means 
Medium SAD 
Medium FNE 
Adjusted 
Means 
Medium SAD 
Medium FNE 
Observed 
Means 
Low SAD 
Low FNE 
Adjusted 
Means 
Low SAD 
Low FNE 
40.39 
44.50 
47.04 
50.03 
55.39 
53.82 
52.83 
53.25 
60.95 
59.69 
56.68 
54.73 
43.00 
42.47 
57.42 
47.80 
52.86 
56.28 
50.28 
55.70 
62.33 
60.15 
50.49 
55.41 
31.00 
36.47 
37.30 
42.80 
42.05 
42.62 
39.86 
41.87 
51.26 
46.49 
47.14 
40.91 
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significant main effect of type of scenario, ~ (2,221) 
= 14.04, R < .0001. Although a significant main effect 
of SAD was indicated (F (2,109} = 3.70, R = .028}, no 
significant differences among levels of SAD were found 
in the follow-up analyses (R'S> .05}. Simple effects 
analyses of the main effect of scenario revealed that a 
significantly greater percentage of nondepressed-
nondistorted responses was chosen when subjects read 
scenarios with interpersonal themes (M = 52. 19) or 
interpersonal-achievement themes (M = 52.73) as compared 
to achievement themes (M = 41.43}, R's< .01 by Scheffe's 
test. Neither depression nor trait anxiety were 
significant covariates. 
With regard to the SAD conditions in which it was 
found that a significantly greater percentage of 
nondepressed-nondistorted responses was reported in 
scenarios with interpersonal or interpersonal-achievement 
versus achievement themes, the same results were obtained 
by both the analysis of variance and the analysis of 
covariance. Although both the ANOVA and ANCOVA indicated 
an effect of level of SAD, only the ANOVA follow-up 
analyses showed a pattern of significant differences, as 
subjects lower in social anxiety gave a significantly 
greater percentage of nondepressed-nondistorted responses 
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than subjects higher in social anxiety. Al though neither 
depression nor trait anxiety reached significance as 
covariates, the pattern of results did differ somewhat 
once these factors were included in the analyses. 
Fear of Negative Evaluation CFNE) scale 
The observed and adjusted cell means for the 
percentages of nondepressed-nondistorted responses with 
the FNE scale are given in Table 4. Results from an 
ANOVA conducted on the percentage of nondepressed-
nondistorted responses revealed a significant main effect 
of FNE, E (2,111) = 8.23, R < .0001, and a significant 
main effect of type of scenario, E (2,222) = 18.83, R < 
.0001. Simple effects analyses of the FNE main effect 
showed that both low FNE (M = 55.44) and medium FNE (M 
= 50.91) subjects gave a significantly greater percentage 
of nondepressed-nondistorted responses than high FNE 
subjects (M = 41.15), R's < .05 by Scheffe's test. 
Simple effects analyses of the 'scenario main effect 
showed that a significantly higher percentage of 
nondepressed-nondistorted responses was reported in 
scenarios with an interpersonal theme (M = 52.89) or an 
interpersonal-achievement theme (M = 53.25) as compared 
to scenarios with an achievement-only theme (M = 42.00), 
R's < .01 by Scheffe's test. 
An ANCOVA performed on the percentage of 
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nondepressed-nondistorted responses showed a significant 
main effect of type of scenario, £ (2,221) = 13.91, 2 < 
.0001. Simple effects analyses revealed that a 
significantly higher percentage of nondepressed-
nondistorted responses was given in the interpersonal 
scenarios (M = 52.67) and the interpersonal-achievement 
scenarios (M = 52.97) than in the achievement scenarios 
(M = 41. 86), 2' s < • 01 by Scheffe' s test. Neither 
depression nor trait anxiety emerged as a significant 
covariate. 
With regard to the FNE conditions, similar results 
were obtained in terms of the effect of type of scenario, 
as a significantly higher percentage of nondepressed-
nondistorted responses was reported in the interpersonal 
and interpersonal-achievement scenarios as compared to 
the achievement scenarios. Even though neither 
depression nor trait anxiety reached significance as 
covariates, the ANCOVA did not evidence the same pattern 
of results obtained with the ANOVA, the latter analysis 
revealing that subjects low and medium in terms of fear 
of negative evaluation gave a significantly greater 
percentage of nondepressed-nondistorted responses as 
compared to subjects high in fear of negative evaluation. 
In conclusion, the central predictions that subjects 
higher in social avoidance and distress and subject 
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higher in fear of negative evaluation give more 
depressed-distorted responses than subjects lower in 
social avoidance and distress and subjects lower in fear 
of negative evaluation were supported. Significant 
results were also obtained after depression and trait 
anxiety were used as covariates in the SAD conditions 
but not in the FNE conditions (even though neither 
covariate reached significance in these analyses) . All 
of the analyses involving depressed-nondistorted 
responses showed that a significantly higher percentage 
of these responses was given in the scenarios with 
achievement themes than in scenarios with interpersonal 
or interpersonal-achievement themes. In addition, most 
of the analyses involving nondepressed-distorted and 
nondepressed-nondistorted responses revealed that a 
significantly greater percentage of these responses was 
reported in interpersonal or interpersonal-achievement 
scenarios as compared to achievement-only scenarios. 
Given that the analyses used percentages of the total 
number of responses and that the depressed-distorted 
response variable was significant, it is not surprising 
that the other response variables (depressed-
nondistorted, nondepressed-distorted, nondepressed-
nondistorted) were often also significant. In general, 
similar patterns of results were found in the 
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corresponding ANOVAs and ANCOVAs. Although depression 
level and trait anxiety level did not always reach 
significance as covariates, the latter was significant 
more often than the former. 
DISCUSSION 
Taken as a whole, the results of this investigation 
support the existence of depressogenic-type cognitive 
distortions in social anxiety. As predicted, compared 
to less socially anxious individuals, more highly 
socially anxious subjects selected a greater percentage 
of depressed-distorted responses on the Cognitive 
Distortion Questionnaire (CDQ). Hence, people high in 
social anxiety appear to distort cognitively in ways 
similar to depressives. In terms of social avoidance 
and distress, these findings were maintained even after 
depression and trait anxiety levels were covaried out. 
The pattern of results using the fear of negative 
evaluation measure, however, was not as straightforward 
as the social avoidance and distress measure in terms of 
depressed-distorted responses. Although subjects higher 
in fear of negative evaluation' did report a greater 
percentage of depressed-distorted responses than subjects 
lower in fear of negative evaluation, these results were 
no longer significant once depression and trait anxiety 
were covaried out (even though neither covariate was 
significant). This FNE main effect may have disappeared 
in the ANCOVA because trait anxiety was highly correlated 
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with the FNE measure. Regardless of SAD or FNE level, 
nondepressed-nondistorted responses were the most common 
for all groups. Overall, though, the results of the 
present study suggest that cognitive distortions which 
had been previously addressed almost exclusively in 
relation to depression seem also to operate in the 
socially anxious individual. 
As indicated above, the pattern of results using the 
FNE scale was somewhat complicated. The main hypothesis 
was confirmed that subjects higher in fear of negative 
evaluation would give a significantly higher percentage 
of depressed-distorted responses than subjects lower in 
fear of negative evaluation. However, the follow-up 
analyses of the significant main effect of FNE found in 
the ANCOVA failed to reveal any significant differences 
even though neither of the covariates (depression and 
trait anxiety) reached significance. However, trait 
) 
anxiety did approach significance in this case and 
perhaps accounts to some extent for the lack of 
significance among FNE levels in depressed-distorted 
responses. In an attempt to clarify the interpretation 
of these results, correlations were calculated among the 
SAD, FNE, BDI, and trait anxiety measure. Trait anxiety 
was found to be highly correlated with the FNE (r = 
• 564) . Therefore, a large portion of the effects of fear 
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of negative evaluation was due to trait anxiety. Another 
possible explanation for the lack of significance in the 
simple effects analyses in this ANCOVA is the relatively 
high amount of variance in the FNE condition which 
affects greatly the statistical calculations of pairwise 
differences. Despite the nonsignificant follow-up 
analyses, though, the pattern of FNE group means follows 
the same pattern of results found with the ANOVA, in 
which high FNE subjects reported more depressed-distorted 
responses than medium or low FNE subjects. 
Interestingly, with regard to depressed-distorted 
responses, significant differences were obtained between 
the high versus medium and low social anxiety conditions 
but not between the medium versus low social anxiety 
conditions. With regard to SAD and FNE scores, the 
subjects in our study approximated the means and standard 
deviations found by Watson and Friend (1969) in their 
college student sample. In addition, the identifications 
of subjects in our investigation as high, medium, or low 
in social anxiety seem to be similar to those used in 
other social anxiety research (e.g., Halford & Foddy, 
1982). our study's finding suggests that there is a 
significant quantitative if not qualitative difference 
between people who experience high degrees of social 
anxiety as compared to people who experience more 
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moderate or low levels of social anxiety. It appears 
that the highly socially anxious individual engages in 
more depressogenic-type cognitive distortion than either 
the moderately or low socially anxious individual. 
The present study addressed three types of situations 
in which social anxiety may or may not occur: (1) 
interpersonal situations (e.g., a male-female 
relationship), (2) achievement situations with a major 
interpersonal component (e.g., running for president of 
an organization), and (3) achievement situations without 
a major interpersonal component (e.g., receiving LSAT 
scores in the mail) . It was predicted that depressogenic 
cognitive distortion effects would be found for people 
higher in social anxiety in the first two conditions 
which both involve some interpersonal component, but not 
in the third condition in which the social component is 
less prominent. This predicted interaction was not 
found. 
higher 
Across all three types of scenarios, subjects 
in social anxiety and distress reported more 
depressed-distorted responses than subjects moderate or 
low in social anxiety. Even though the covariates of 
depression and trait anxiety were not significant in this 
analysis, their inclusion in the ANCOVA resulted in the 
same pattern of depressed-distorted responses in the 
interpersonal scenarios and the achievement scenarios but 
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not in the interpersonal-achievement scenarios. It is 
unclear why this pattern did not hold for the scenarios 
with an interpersonal-achievement theme, especially given 
such results were found in the stories with an 
interpersonal theme and with an achievement theme. 
Nevertheless, even in situations which presumably did not 
have an interpersonal component, highly socially anxious 
subjects demonstrated greater depressogenic cognitive 
distortion than moderately or low socially anxious 
subjects. It may be that the "achievement-only" 
scenarios developed for this study actually do have a 
component of anticipated social interaction. For 
example, getting test scores in the mail does not involve 
social interaction at the moment when one opens the 
envelope. However, one may anticipate other people 
asking about how she or he performed on the test. Hence, 
as long as there is even the potential for a future 
social interaction, people who ~xperience high degrees 
of social anxiety may be prone to a depressive-type of 
cognitive distortion. Given the social nature of human 
existence, this tendency is potentially very problematic 
in many areas of the highly socially anxious person's 
life. Future research could look at socially anxious 
people's cognitive operations in social situations as 
well as situations without any immediate or anticipated 
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social interaction. 
In terms of distortion which is nondepressive in 
quality (i.e., nondepressed-distorted responses in this 
study), only subjects who were low or medium in social 
avoidance and distress gave more nondepressed-distorted 
responses in interpersonal or interpersonal-achievement 
scenarios as compared to achievement scenarios. It may 
be that the nondepressed-distorted response (e.g. , "When 
you first heard you'd lost [the election for president 
of the organization], you shrug it off as unimportant") 
represents a sort of self-serving bias. That is, most 
normal people (i.e., low or moderately socially anxious 
people) may engage in "ego-defensive" strategies to 
protect their self-images when confronted with 
interpersonally-involved failure situations. Again, 
because our world is so highly social, such a self-
protective tendency would prove valuable. Based on the 
data in this study, it would appear that highly socially 
anxious people fail to engage in these self-protective, 
albeit biasing, operations. This tendency to distort in 
a more self-serving direction has also been found to 
occur in the attributional styles of nondepressives 
(e.g., Johnson, Petzel, Zarantonello, & Johnson, 1985). 
In terms of nondistorted responses (depressed-
nondistorted, nondepressed-nondistorted), subjects, 
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regardless of level of social anxiety or fear of negative 
evaluation, responded differently to the three scenario 
themes. More depressed-nondistorted responses were given 
in achievement scenarios than either interpersonal or 
interpersonal-achievement scenarios, whereas more 
nondepressed-nondistorted responses were given in 
interpersonal and interpersonal-achievement scenarios 
than in achievement scenarios. For many people, failure 
situations which occur without an immediate interpersonal 
component seem to be responded to with depressed 
feelings. 
Although level of depression and trait anxiety were 
employed as covariates in this study, they frequently 
failed to reach significance in the analyses of 
covariance. Trait anxiety was more often a significant 
covariate than depression, suggesting that social anxiety 
is related more to general anxiety than to depression. 
Correlations among the SAD, FNE, BDI, and trait anxiety 
measures gives credence to this interpretation. Trait 
anxiety was more highly correlated with both the SAD (r 
= • 554) and the FNE (r = • 564) than depression was 
correlated with either the SAD (r = .416) or the FNE (r 
= . 291) . Given this study' s findings that socially 
anxious people cognitively distort information in much 
the same way that depressed people do, it is somewhat 
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surprising that depression was not found to play a 
greater role in social anxiety. Further, given the 
relationship between social anxiety and trait anxiety as 
well as the relationship between depressogenic cognitive 
distortion and social anxiety, it might be interesting 
to look at whether depressive cognitive distortion also 
occurs in people with more general trait anxiety. 
Indeed, our study found a high correlation between 
depression and trait anxiety (r = .588). 
What are the implications of the present study for 
our understanding of the phenomenon of social anxiety? 
Essentially, our data suggest that highly socially 
anxious persons tend to distort information in ways 
similar to depressed persons. The findings of the 
present investigation fit with Beck's cognitive model of 
psychopathology, often discussed in terms of depression 
but also in reference to anxiety or paranoid states 
(Beck, 1970). Whereas Krantz and Hammen (1979) suggested 
that "persons who are depressed are unique in their 
selective use of certain types of errors (arbitrary 
inference, selective abstraction, overgeneralization, and 
maximization of negative or minimization of 
positive] ... in the interpretation of information ... as 
described by Beck" (p. 618), the present findings argue 
for the existence of these cognitive errors, i.e. , 
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depressive-distortion in Krantz and Hammen's terms, as 
operative in social anxiety and therefore not unique to 
depression. 
With regard to this issue of specificity of cognitive 
distortions in different disorders, Beck and his 
associates (Beck, 1976; Beck, Brown, Steer, Eidelson, & 
Riskind, 1987; Beck & Emery, 1985) have argued for 
differentiating anxiety and depression in terms of 
cognitive content specific to each type of disorder. 
This approach has been called the content-specificity 
hypothesis of the cognitive model of psychopathology. 
This hypothesis suggests that the cognitive content 
(including automatic thoughts, interpretations, and 
imagery) of the anxious person is centered around the 
theme of danger, physical or psychosocial threat, and 
anticipated future harm. The depressed person's 
cognitive content, on the other hand, is characterized 
by the theme of negative attituaes about the past and 
future as well as self-deprecation. Although these two 
types of cognitive content may be relatively easily 
distinguished in some cases, it may not always be 
possible to classify a particular thought as reflecting 
more of a "depressive" theme or an "anxious" theme. For 
example, an item from the Cognition Checklist (CCL), 
which was developed in order to assess the frequency of 
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automatic thoughts relevant to anxiety and depression, 
demonstrates this apparent overlap in depressive versus 
anxiety themes: "There's something very wrong with me" 
(Beck, Brown, Steer, Eidelson, & Riskind, 1987). Such 
a self-statement seems to reflect not only the 
"depressive" theme of failure but also the "anxiety" 
theme of danger. Indeed, there is a substantial 
correlation between the anxiety and the depression 
subscales of the CCL (Beck, Brown, Steer, Eidelson, & 
Riskind, 1987). Although this measure does not directly 
address social anxiety, it is implied that social anxiety 
would have a cognitive content theme similar to that for 
general anxiety but more specific to anticipating harm 
in social situations. Yet, our data indicate that 
socially anxious people seem to share with depressives 
the tendency toward more self-deprecating cognitions. 
A number of different explanations could be offered here. 
It may be that social anxiety, as a "disorder," falls 
between depression and general anxiety in terms of 
cognitive content. Or, perhaps the distinction between 
anxiety-specific and depression-specific cognitive 
content is not as clear as previously thought. It could 
also be that the CDQ used in this study, a measure 
designed to assess depressive cognitive distortions, may 
include cognitive statements representative of "anxiety" 
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as well as "depression" themes. For example, the CDQ 
depressed-distorted response of "when you first heard 
you'd lost [the election], you immediately feel bad and 
imagine I've lost by a landslide" seems to exemplify an 
"anxious" theme of harm (i.e., imagining being "crushed" 
and rejected as a candidate) as well as a "depressive" 
theme of failure and loss. Future studies might employ 
the CCL with socially anxious subjects in order to assess 
further the cognitive content-specificity hypothesis. 
Based on the present results, it seems likely that 
less socially anxious people also distort information 
but in a more positively-biasing direction. Conversely, 
the more socially anxious person evidently distorts 
information in a negative, self-deprecating direction. 
These results may be understood within the context of 
Schlenker and Leary's (1982) self-presentational model 
of social anxiety, as depressogenic cognitive distortion 
may serve as a self-handicapping strategy. The socially 
anxious person may "assume the worst" as a strategy to 
avoid greater social embarrassment by making the mistake 
of not being aware of an apparent failure. In some 
sense, it. may be that different "self-protective" 
strategies are employed by people who are lower versus 
higher in social anxiety. Less socially anxious 
individuals tend toward what we could call "positive-
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biasing," whereas more socially anxious individuals tend 
toward "negative-biasing." 
With regard to implications for therapeutic 
intervention with socially anxious individuals, the 
present investigation provides indirect support for the 
use of cognitive-based approaches. Given the evidence 
of cognitive distortion of information found to occur in 
socially anxious people, it is suggested that treatment 
should in some way address the cognitive errors discussed 
by Beck (1970) and represented in the cognitive 
distortion measure used in our study. Based on our 
findings regarding the similarity in cognitive bias 
between highly socially and depressed individuals, 
treatment approaches which have been successful in 
modifying the distorted cognitions of depressives could 
also be effective with the socially anxious. Recently, 
Butler (1989) has discussed a cognitive approach, which 
has been developed from work with depression, to treating 
social anxiety. This approach is largely geared toward 
counteracting cognitive biases affecting the past, 
present, and future. The cognitive therapeutic method 
of rational restructuring, which teaches the client to 
reevaluate more realistically the consequences of his or 
her behavior in different situations, has been shown to 
be a useful approach in reducing social anxiety (see 
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Glass & Shea, 1986, for a review of clinical outcome 
research for social anxiety), likely because the client 
learns to counteract his or her tendency to interpret 
events in a negative, self-deprecating way. 
Although our investigation has implications for the 
cognitive treatment of social anxiety, it is crucial to 
include a behavioral component in this type of 
therapeutic program. It is essential for the client to 
test his or her "new" style of thinking in practice 
(Butler, 1989). Hence, the present study provides 
inferential support for modeling social anxiety treatment 
approaches from depression treatment approaches (see 
Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979, cited in Butler, 1989). 
As with other problems, treatment strategies for the 
socially anxious should be tailored to the individual's 
specific difficulties (Leary, 1983a). It may be that 
clinicians give a battery of diagnostic tests, including 
a measure of cognitive distortion, in order to develop 
an individualized treatment program. 
In addition to the ideas for further research already 
proposed above, future studies could address the socially 
anxious person's development of the patterns of cognitive 
distortion evidenced by the present study. It would also 
be important to investigate whether this cognitive 
distortion is maintained over time. Certainly, efforts 
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to ascertain the initial development of cognitive 
distortion in social anxiety would prove valuable in 
treatment and prevention of this distressing experience. 
Though our investigation did include different types of 
situations that might result in social anxiety for some 
individuals, further research could assess various 
shyness-eliciting situations in an effort to identify 
specific situational characteristics that are associated 
with high social anxiety. Another relevant research 
project might look at the interaction between individual 
differences and situational factors. Additionally, 
investigations of the cognitions (and possible cognitive 
distortions) of consistently socially anxious versus 
variably socially anxious individuals would be important 
to address (see Russell, Cutrona, & Jones, 1986, for a 
discussion of self-perceived consistency versus 
variability). Experimental manipulation, correlational, 
) 
or perhaps even observational data may be used in future 
research in this area. 
In conclusion, the aim of the present study was to 
determine if cognitive distortions traditionally viewed 
as pertinent to depression may also be relevant to 
understanding social anxiety. Results supported the 
primary prediction that more highly socially anxious 
subjects give more depressed-distorted responses than 
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less socially anxious subjects. Thus, more highly 
socially anxious individuals tend to interpret events in 
negative, pessimistic, and self-deprecating ways. 
Furthermore, these cognitive distortions cannot simply 
be explained by the fact that socially anxious subjects 
tend, as a group, to be more depressed than nonsocially 
anxious subject, as our results were not altered by 
covarying out depression level. Given these findings, 
there are important therapeutic implications for the 
understanding and treatment of highly socially anxious 
people. 
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Cognitive Distortion Questionnaire (male form) 
Instructions: Carefully read each of the following scenarios 
putting yourself in the place of the main character in each 
scenario. Then answer the questions fol lowing each scenario on 
the answer sheet provided. 
Paul had joined a particular organization a couple of years ago 
because he was· very committed to its goals and practices. He 
knew most of the members by now, and a few had even become fairly 
close friends. Paul had been fairly active but had never really 
stood out. Several friends in his current group thought that his 
ideas were sound and they began to urge him to run for president 
of the organization in the upcoming election. Paul was very 
reluctant at first, feeling he was unqualified, but finally he 
decided to run because he thought he did have energy and ideas to 
contribute. No man had ever held the position before, but his 
friends thought he had a good chance to win. When elections were 
held, Paul ran for presidency but he lost. 
Put yourself in Paul's place, trying as vividly as you can to 
imagine what he probably thought and felt. 
1. When 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
you first heard you'd lost, you immediat~ 
feel bad and imagine I've lost by a landsiide. 
shrug it off as unimportant 
feel sad and wonder what the total counts were. 
shrug it off, feeling I've tried as hard as I could. 
2. After the election you conclude. 
a. I feel really depressed abut losing, but I'll continue 
to work for my goals once I get my enthusiasm back. 
b. It's okay that I lost, since it is a useful 
illustration of the inevitable prejudice against male 
leadership. 
e. I'm not a winner at anything. I never should have let 
myself be talked into running. 
d. The campaign was a good experience even though I didn't 
win. 
3. When you compare the winner's "platform" to yours, you think: 
a. Mine was good for a first attempt, and was vastly 
better than my opponents. 
b. Despite what my friends said, mine wasn't good at all. 
c. I feel badly that I didn't do a better job on it, but 
I'll know next time. 
d. Mine showed some inexperience but was pretty good for a 
first attempt. 
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John is a senior at a large university. He dislikes the lack of 
faculty-student contact, so he usually makes an effort to talk to 
his teachers outside the classroom. So after he received an 
average score on a midterm, he went to the professor, Dr. Smith, 
to talk over the test Dr. Smith pointed out the correct 
answers and the reasons for them on the questions he missed. She 
also gave him some helpful tips on studying. After about 45 
minutes, Dr. Smith said she was quite busy and hoped he would 
excuse her. She then walked John to the door and said it was 
nice talking to him. 
Put yourself in :::fohl'\'..S place, trying to imagine as vividly as 
you can what he probab1y thought and felt. 
4. Are you satisfied with your meeting with Dr. Smith? 
a. Yes, because she was quite pleased with my visit and 
will probably give me a good grade in the course. 
b. Although it's upsetting for me to realize it, I probably 
need tips on studying. 
c. Yes,~he answered all my questions and I made a good 
contact. 
d. No,'1'he probably thinks I'm dumb, which is why.,s:he gave 
me tips on study habits. 
5. Looking over the questions you missed, you decide: 
a. It's not my fault, the teacher should make a better 
test. 
b. Unfortunately, my performance on this test is 
indicative of my true ability. I'm.mediocre student. 
c. I feel bad that I missed those questions. 
d. Now that :t ·' ve talked to the teacher, .1 hope :r '11 
do better on the final. 
6· You thought Dr. Smith was rather nice in walking you to the 
door. Your reaction to her gesture was: 
a. Embarrassment. She was trying to hurry me out. 
b. Appreciation that she realized that it was worth her 
time to help me. 
c. Appreciation - She seemed interested and concerned. 
d. Sort of sad and let down that the meeting had to end. 
7, How did your meeting with the professor change your view of 
the large, impersonal, university? 
a. Dr. Smith helped to make the university seem less 
impersonal. 
b .. 1 realize· that the faculty is always happy to talk with 
students. 
c. Although Dr. Smith was willing to talk to me, I still 
feel lost and a little lonely at the large, impersonal 
university. 
d. Even though the professor was polite, I still felt that 
She resented my taking up so much of h~~ time, and that 
made me feel bad. -
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Lisa and Jason have been dating for the past few months. Lisa is 
neither pretty nor ugly and has a pleasant personality. Jason is 
usually fun to be with and often takes her to nice restaurants 
and theaters. Tonight she seemed to be unhappy despite his 
attempts to start light-hearted conversations. He asked her if 
anything was wrong. She replied that she was having some 
problems at work that she didn't want to talk about, but was 
grateful for his concern. She seemed a little more cheerful 
after that. 
Put yourself in Jason's place, trying to imagine as vividly as 
you can what he probably thought and felt. 
8 You think about the future of this relationship and you 
imagine: 
a. It's a pretty good relationship, and we're getting to 
know each other as time goes on. 
b. It's a pretty good relationship and I•m generally 
satisfied although I think the relationship has a few 
problems. 
c. I would probably have a hard time finding someone else 
who would care about me, so I want to make this 
relationship work out. 
d. It is not what I really want it to be, and that makes 
me sad, so I will leave myself open to contacts with 
other women. 
9. You wonder why Lisa hasn't called for several days. 
a. I decide I don't really know what and figure I should 
ask her. 
b. All I can think of is that she must not care about me. 
c. I imagine that she thinks so highly of me that she 
sometimes is afraid of risking rejection or pushing me 
too hard. 
d. I feel unh~ppy about it but figure that things 
sometimes do not happen exactly the way one would like. 
10· Why do you think her mood changed after you asked her if 
there was a problem? 
a. I feel pleased and imagine I can be very therapeutic 
for her and most others. 
b. I don't know why since it may have been due to any 
number of things, but I am happy that her mood changed. 
c. I just don't understand her moods, which worries and 
upsets me even though I know it's very hard to really 
understand another person. 
d. I wish I could believe that I had something to do with 
it, but I rarely have the ability to cheer anyone up. 
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11. You wonC.er wh"l' s!-.e gc t i:i the bad mood, and imagine that: 
a. I feel badly that I don't un~erstand h~r. b~t it's 
really difficult tc u~dersta~d everything about 
so!':lel:>:>d)% else. 
b. like :r:c.,::t pac;ile, she has a few problems that botiler 
c. 
her. 
It's beca~s~ sbe is extremely immature and moody; 
I, C:l. th~ ether hand, am calm and happy. 
1;:Jut 
d. It's b~c~us~ ste's dating the mnst bleak, plain ~an i~ 
t . . n-= c; i t:t . 
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Len is a sophomore, living in one of the dorms. He's moderately 
good looking, friendly, a bit on the quiet side, an A 
student. He frequently admires men of his age who appear to be 
outgoing, although he's aware of the disadvantages of that 
personality as well. One of his concerns is making friends. 
In his freshman year he kept busy with school work and maintained 
relationships he'd had in high school. But this year he has 
become more aware that he wantsto meet people and make friends on 
campus. He's uncertain quite how to go about it. 
Tonight is Friday night, and Len can't deny to himself that he 
feels lonely. Most of the men on his floor are out for the 
evening or gone for the weekend. At the far end of the hall the 
men in two or three rooms are in tonight as well. While he's in 
the shower, he hears one of them mention plans for going out 
later for pizza to a place where they know women are going to be. 
Put yourself in Len's place and try to imagine as vividly as you 
can how he might think and feel. 
12. Your first reaction when you hear that they are going out 
is: 
a. Unhappiness. They probably would have asked me to come 
if they liked me more. 
b. Unhappiness and increased loneliness. Sounds like I'll 
be practically alone on the floor. 
c. I w.-ider if they'd mind if I'd come along. 
d. Relief. They seem unfriendly for not asking me, so I'm 
happy since I don't have to be with them. 
13, Being alone on a Friday night:' 
a. doesn't bother me because I figure I'll have a date 
next weekend for sure. 
b. upsets me and makes me feel lonely. 
c. upsets me and makes me start to imagine endless days 
and nights by myself. 
d. I can handle it because one Friday night alone isn't 
that important; probably everybody has spent one night 
alone. 
14 You sit at your desk trying to get some reading done. Your 
mind keeps flashing on: 
a. pleasant memories of a recent date you've had. 
b. an upcoming blind date which you expect will go very 
well. 
c. I'm lonely and down but everybody is lonely once in a 
while. 
d. the feeling that not having a date tonight is one of 
the most painful things I can imagine. 
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15. People have always told you that you have a nice smile. 
You're thinking about your looks now and feel: 
a. it's unimportant what people think about my looks or 
anyone else's looks. 
b. fairly satisfied about my looks. 
c. really ugly and undesirable. When someone compliments 
my looks I think they're just being polite. 
d. unhappy because even though I feel fairly good looking 
it didn't seem to be an asset in getting a date 
tonight. 
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Mark has been working on getting into better physical shape. He 
bought an exercise book that set out a detailed six-month program 
that included specific goals for each month, taking into account 
his age and other factors. He 1 s been following the program 
pretty closely for the past month. He's worked particularly hard 
at decreasing his time for his one-mile run. Four days a week, 
he has been getting up before work to run, trying to keep up with 
the goals set up in his exercise book. Although he has improved 
his time, he has not been able to keep up with the goals in the 
book. 
Put yourself in Mark's place, trying to imagine as vividly as you 
can what he probably thought and felt. 
i6. When you think about the time you put into your exercise 
program during the past month, you feel: 
a. I didn 1 t put as much effort in as I should have, 
because I lack the necessary self-discipline, and that 
makes me feel bad. 
b. Even if running has never been my best sport, it still 
really bothers me that I couldn't keep up with the 
program's goals. 
c. I put in a reasonable amount of time and effort, and I 
feel good about that. 
d. I spent too much time trying to follow this 
unreasonable exercise program. 
17· When you think about the physical shape you're in now, you 
think: 
a. Since I didn't keep up with the program's goals, I'm 
really not in any better shape than a month ago, and 
I'm feeling frustrated and hopeless about ever getting 
into good physical shape. 
b. I'm in better shape than a month ago, and the 
improvement pleases me. 
c. I'm really disappointed that I'm not in the shape that 
I should be at this point, but at least I'm doing a 
little better than a month ago. 
d. I'm in good shape now; the goals in the book are 
absurd. 
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18· Your thoughts about continuing with this exercise program 
are: 
a. I feel good about this program, and I think I'll 
continue with it for the full six months. 
b. I'm pretty down on myself for not being able to keep up 
with the program's goals for the first month; I 
certainly will never be able to keep up for the rest of 
it. 
c. I don't need to continue with this exercise program, 
because I've made some improvements already. 
d. I'm really disappointed in myself for not keeping up 
with the program's goals in the first month, but I 
still want to get in shape, so I think I'll continue 
with the program. 
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Fred had started working in the main off ice last week. It felt 
like it had taken forever to find this job after he moved to 
Chicago. He had grown up in a small town some distance, and 
since he moved had met few people. The others who worked in the 
same office seemed friendly, although most of them were 
considerably older than he. One woman, Carolyn, was about his 
age, sort of pretty, but she worked down the hall and he saw her 
only occasionally .. Taking his coffee break in the snack bar one 
afternoon, she came over and sat with him. They talked for 
awhile. He found her fun and pleasant, and they seemed to enjoy 
each other. The break ended and he had to get back to his 
office. He found himself thinking about her that afternoon-
fantasizing about going out with her, wondering what she's like. 
He looked forward to seeing her the next day. At lunch the next 
afternoon, he sat alone in the snack bar and saw her come in. She 
saw him, smiled and waved, but she took her lunch to another 
empty table on the far side of the room. 
Put yourself in Fred's place and try to imagine as vividly as you 
can what he might think and feel. 
1~. Your first reaction was to think: 
a. I might consider being a little assertive and pursue 
her. 
b. I'm unhappy that she prefers to eat alone this 
afternoon. 
c. she dislikes me and wants me to get the message. 
d. she's playing hard to get. 
20. Seeing her makes you think of your romantic prospects in 
Chicago, you imagine: 
a. I get really discouraged about how hard it is to meet 
good people, but almost everyone has problems with it 
too. 
b. I feel like I'll never meet anyone who is interested in 
me. 
c. I can't expect the first woman to come along to be the 
Big Romance. 
d. Women in Chicago are awfully conceited. 
21, Thinking back on your conversation with Carolyn, your 
judgement is: 
a. I know he really was excited by me and I'm mystified 
about why he's avoiding me. 
b. I'm afraid it wasn't as interesting as I first thought. 
c. The conversation was pleasant; that probably had 
nothing to do with whether sh~interested in me or not. 
d. I must have failed at making a good impression. 
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22. Reflecting on your life here in Chicago, you think: 
a. I'll just have to wait and see what the future will 
bring; it's too soon to tell. 
b. I have just about everything I want and I know I'll be 
a big hit in this town. 
c. Loneliness is a big problem for me, but then I suppose 
it's also a problem for all newcomers. 
d. No one in Chicago will ever really care about me, but 
at least I have a job. 
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Pete is a sophomore in college with an A-/B+ average. He has 
declared his major in business and is presently taking a 
microeconomics class as part of the required courses for his 
major. Last week, he took his midterm in microeconomics, an exam 
which counts for half of his grade. His professor told the class 
she would post their midterm grades on the classroom door, using 
each student's social security number instead of name. Pete goes 
to his classroom door to find out how he had done on his midterm. 
After locating his social security number on the posted sheet, he 
finds that he got a C-. 
Put yourself in Pete's place, trying as vividly as you can to 
imagine what he probably thought and felt. 
zj. When you first saw your midterm grade, you thought: 
a. This grade is so bad, I'm really not smart enough for 
this class. 
b. I didn't do well, because it was a very poorly designed 
exam. 
c. I feel pretty depressed about this grade; I wonder 
which ones I got wrong. 
d. I tried my best on this exam, and I'll try to do better 
on the next one. 
24. When you think about your major in business, you think: 
a. Microeconomics is only one class; I'm sure I'll ace all 
of the other business courses. 
b. This midterm grade has really brought me down and 
indicates to me that I should probably change my major. 
c. My performance in this class so far really bothers me, 
but it doesn't mean I won't be a good business major. 
d. I'll have to work harder in my other business classes 
in order to make up for tqis class. 
25· When you think about finishing up the rest of your 
microeconomics class, you decide: 
a. I' 11 have to work extra hard in the rest of this 
course, because I really want to do well. 
b. The teacher really isn't very good, so why work hard. 
c. I' 11 never be able to get a. 
d. It really upsets me that I probably won't get as good a 
grade as I'd like, but at least I'm learning something. 
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Ed was a graduate student, and he aspired to be a good teacher. 
It was very important to him to communicate well with others, and 
he liked the idea of turning students on to particular viewpoints 
that the'tmay never have considered before. His father had been a 
professc!r in a small college and although their relationship was 
strained at times, he had always respected his father and thought 
that being a professor was a good life. Ed was a sensitive 
person.-'.'."lercept i ve and insightful and he was aware that part of 
his motivation stemmed from the role of being an "expert" and 
having people be impressed by his knowledge. 
An opportunity to test his teaching skills arrived in the form of 
a class presentation that all the students in one of his seminars 
were required to make. Ed probably put in a bit more than 
average preparation on his topic. When the day came for his 
presentation, he seemed calm and poised (although rather nervous 
on the inside). During his talk, students commented and asked 
questions; no one yawned or dO'Ced. One question had been rather 
hard to answer. No one said anything to him afterwards since it 
was late in the day, everyone left immediately afterward. 
Put yourself in Ed's place and try to imagine as vividly as you 
can what he probably thought and felt. 
2~ You try to judge how well your talk went. You decide: 
a. + clearly did the best job of anyone. 
b. ~ccording to my standards, I think it went okay. 
c. I'm disappointed that no one complimented me. 
d. I hoped someone would tell me it went well, but since no 
one said anything, I'm afraid it wasn't very good. 
27. When you thought about it afterwards, the thing that mostly 
comes to mind is: 
a. I feel good; relieved that the whole thing is over. 
b. I feel disappointed that I ,didn't get feedback about how 
I'd done 
c. I feel bad about the one question I didn't answer. I 
think it made me look ridiculous. 
d. I feel good because now the teacher will see my genius. 
22. You're wondering what grade you might be given for the 
presentation by the instructor. 
a. I feel that because of the one question that stumped me, 
he'll conclude that I didn't really prepare well enough 
to earn an A. 
b. I saw him nod once or twice, so he was really impressed 
and I'll get an A. 
c. I'm quite worried abut the grade but I don't know how 
he'll grade. 
d. I think I'll get an A because it's a graduate seminar and because 
I clearly did as much as anyone else and an A is usual under these 
circumstances. 
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29 . With respect to your future career as a college teacher, you 
conclude: 
a. I'm afraid I won't make it because I know the 
competition for jobs is stiff. 
b. I'm optimistic because I've always been lucky. 
c. since my seminar presentation didn't go very well, I 
feel pretty pessimistic about my chances. 
d. I'm optimistic since my grades are good. 
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Tom is a junior in college and has for the last couple of years 
considered going to law school after he graduates. So, several 
weeks ago, he decided to take the required entrance exam, the Law 
School Admissions Test (LSAT). He knew how important it was to 
score well on the LSAT in order to get into a good law school. 
Yesterday, he received his LSAT scores in the mail, and he scored 
lower than he had expected. 
Put yourself in Tom's place, trying to imagine as vividly as you 
can what he probably thought and felt. 
30 When you first read that your scores weren't as high as you 
expected, you: 
a. feel very disappointed, but decide you tried your best. 
b. decide your scores really were pretty good after all. 
c. decide you had done okay according to your standards. 
d. feel very disappointed and think it confirms that 
you're not very ~mart. 
31 The next day, after you've had awhile to think about it, you 
decide: 
a. It's okay that my scores weren't that high since these 
tests are ridiculous to begin with. 
b. I'll never be a successful lawyer. 
c. It was a good experience for me to take this test even 
if I didn't score as well as I wanted. 
d. I'm really depressed about my scores, but I still think 
I could be a good lawyer. 
32 When you think about applying to law schools, you think: 
a. There's no point in wasting my time applying to law 
schools. There's no way, any of them will accept me 
with these LSAT scores. 
b. Although it makes me sad to think that my LSAT scores 
aren't good enough for me to get into a top law school, 
I think I'll apply to some other law schools, even if 
they aren't the best ones. 
c. I'm not too concerned. My LSAT scores don't real 1 y 
matter that much, because I've had a lot of related job 
experience. 
d. I'll apply to schools that have accepted people with 
LSAT scores close to mine. 
-. 
I. 
lI. 
III. 
IV. 
v. 
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Cciz:ni ti v::? Di !;tcrt i o:l 0-Jn.st i cr.:rni re 
Scori!'!t; Y.cy 
C. Haz:cen ~ S. Krantz 
J • 
DD ~ d~pr~szed, di!jtc~ted 
DUD = dcr;ressc<i, nor.dis~crted. 
!IDD = nonccpressed, distorte:i 
I!D!lD = non~epressed, nondistor~ed 
Paul/Fe;.:;c~ (!:vtf(..Y' fO'JOIV~.J1 - Ac,h1lV!it"~ j 
1. &. DD 2. a. mm 3. a.. ?IDD 
b. NDD b. l:DD b. DD 
c:. D:m c. DD c. mm 
d. nmm d. ImrID d. un:m 
Lisa/Jason {;rnf:!rpe..r;;on~ I) 
a a. !iDD ~ a. xm:m to. a. !IDD n. a. D!ID 
b. iID!ID b. DD b. HD:1D b. ?ID LID 
C·. DD c. NDD 
-
c •. mm c. ?IDD 
d. DUD d. mm d. DD d. DD 
. \ 
Carl/Carolyn/~~._/ (;rnfe rr:e r5on,,_ \ ) 
\~. 2.. IID!ID ~ a. n:m .t~ a. IU)D ~a. mmn 
~ .. D?ID b. DD b. DUD b. NDD 
c:. DD c. ?IDZ-ID c. umm c. mm 
d. I1DD d. IIDD d. DD d. DD 
John/.J~ice (1nt~ :r·ve.,~ >onr:r(-/re..h1_lVtfl1t17+') 
If, a. !:DD 5. a. !~D fl, a. DD 7. a. NDMD 
b. mm b. DD b. !IDD b. !IDD 
c. nmm c. mm c •. lIDHD c. mm 
d. DD d. xrmrn d. DIID d. DD 
Ler 'l.o1.(tSt. -(:fnfvptrsoncil) 
~· a. DD f3· a. ?:DD \11. a. rmzm IS a. ?.'DD b. mm b. mm b. NDD b. umm 
c. ?ID!tD c. DD c. mm c. DD 
d. llD~ . d. nmm d. DD d. DlID 
vr .. Ed/Elle~ (1:ah rpt (·:an~ -- Acli i{ '/untnT) 
;.rp. a. !iDD V! 
-0 .• a. I:nr;n t::RB. a. DD ·~, a. D!ID 
b. ND!ID b. mm b. lIDD b. NDD 
c. D:ID c. DD c. mm c •. DD 
d. DD d. HDD d. ICDND d. ?CD!iD 
Code: 
SCORING KEY FOR 
COGNITIVE DISTORTION QUESTIONNAIRE ADDENDUM 
Dep-Dis 
Dep-Ndis 
Ndep-Dis 
Ndep-Ndis 
Depressed-Distorted Response 
= Depressed-Nondistorted Response 
= Nondepressed-Distorted Response 
Nondepressed-Nondistorted Response 
16. a. Dep-Dis MARK/MOLLY (Achievement) 
b. Dep-Ndis 
c. Ndep-Ndis 
d. Ndep-Dis 
17. a. Dep-Dis 
b. Ndep-Ndis 
c. Dep-Ndis 
d. Ndep-Dis 
18. a. Ndep-Ndis 
b. Dep-Dis 
c. Ndep-Dis 
d. Dep-Ndis 
23. a. Dep-Dis PETE/PAM (Achievement) 
b. Ndep-Dis 
c. Dep-Ndis 
d. Ndep-Ndis 
24. a. Ndep-Dis 
b. Dep-Dis 
c. Dep-Ndis 
d. Ndep-Ndis 
25. a. Ndep-Ndis 
b. Ndep-Dis 
c. Dep-Dis 
d. Dep-Ndis 
30. a. Dep-Ndis TOM/TRACEY (Achievement) 
b. Ndep-Dis 
c. Ndep-Ndis 
d. Dep-Dis 
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31. a. Ndep-Dis 
b. Dep-Dis 
c. Ndep-Ndis 
d. Dep-Ndis 
32. a. Dep-Dis 
b. Dep-Ndis 
c. Ndep-Dis 
d. Ndep-Ndis 
Note: All questions labelled "Interpersonal" and "Interpersonal-
Achievement" are part of the original Cognitive Distortion 
Questionnaire (Krantz & Hammen, 1979), and the questions labelled 
"Achievement" were developed for this study. 
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